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Brilliance of a Fire:  
Innocence, Experience and the Theory of Childhood 
 
 
ROBERT A. DAVIS 
 
 This essay offer an extensive rehabilitation and reappraisal of the concept 
 of childhood innocence as a means of testing the boundaries of some  
 prevailing constructions of childhood.  It excavates in detail some of the lost 
 histories of innocence in order to show that these are more diverse and more 
 complex than established and pejorative assessments of them conventionally 
 suggest.  Recovering, in particular, the forgotten pedigree of the Romantic  
 account of the innocence of childhood underlines its depth and furnishes an 
 enriched understanding of its critical role in the coming of mass education–– 
 both as a catalyst of social change and as an alternative measure of the child- 
 centredness of the institutions of public education.  Now largely and residually 
 confined to the inheritance of nursery education, the concept of childhood  
 innocence, and the wider Romantic project of which it is an element, can help 
 question the assumptions underpinning modern, competence-centred philosophies 
 of childhood. 
 
There are childhood reveries which surge forth with the brilliance of a fire. 
Gaston Bachelard (1971, p. 100) 
 
I MYTHOLOGIES OF INNOCENCE 
Across a broad range of discourses, from critical theory to the literature of professional 
education, the concept of childhood innocence is the most regularly reviled of a 
constellation of ideas associated with the supposedly orthodox Western construction of 
childhood.1 Amidst the general revision made in the last twenty years to the theory of 
childhood originally associated with the work of Philppe Ariès, the hostility towards the 
principle of childhood innocence, given definitive expression by Ariès (1962, pp. 100-
119), has not only survived the process of revision but actually intensified, invigorated by 
the post-structuralist challenge to the key signifiers of essentialised or unitary identity.2  
Of all of the pioneering interpretations first proposed by Ariès, the critique of ‘innocence’ 
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as a universal and defining property of childhood seems at first glance the most obviously 
valid and unassailable.  Advances in the social sciences, deeper engagements with the 
(often frightful) lives of historically and culturally situated children and, above all, the 
expanding ethnographic record of varied, multiple childhoods across many societies and 
epochs all seem to point irresistibly to the factitious character of the concept of childhood 
innocence and its questionable basis in a contingent and historically-specific set of 
circumstances with little or no salience for the experience of children in the modern 
globalised world (Lancy, 2008).   
 
The alleged redundancy of the idea of innocence is, however, only part of the opposition 
it continues to excite.  In the rigorous application of the hermeneutic of suspicion to a 
cluster of inherited perceptions of childhood, innocence is censured not simply as a fraud, 
but also as a pernicious abstraction, damagingly implicated in the exclusion of children 
from the morally complex realm of the social where such absolutes can have little 
meaning or explanatory significance.  Hence Marina Warner criticises what she 
memorably terms the ‘manichaean diptych’ of angel and devil in which the received 
imagery of childhood innocence traps children, burdening them with an ideal of 
perfection so unsustainable that each inevitable lapse from it in the everyday lives and 
behaviours of young people is invariably condemned as deviant (Warner, 1994, pp. 33-
48). Owain Jones attacks the promulgation of the myth of childhood innocence for its 
collusion with a set of cultural assumptions that differentiate children according to 
markers of class, environment and race.  Rural, white, prosperous children have a special 
access to the legacy of innocence denied their poor, urban and often ethnically mixed 
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counterparts (Jones, 2002). It is through work of this kind that the antipathy towards 
childhood innocence becomes embedded in the values of professional education, in areas 
such as the preparation of childcare practitioners.3 
  
Perhaps the most antagonistic response to the traditions of childhood innocence comes 
currently from the movements in critical theory heir to the Foucauldian project of 
denaturalising the genealogies of human sexuality.  Ariès’ discussion of childhood 
innocence, with its celebrated attention to the intimate training of the infant Louis XIII 
and the sexual mores of the ancien regime French court, anticipated something of this 
line of analysis.  Exposing the ideological processes by which normative constructions of 
sex and gender are authorised and regulated has since become one of the principal targets 
of the postmodern interrogation of the canons of Enlightenment rationality.  Childhood 
innocence is, in this critique, a definitive and pejorative context for the reproduction of 
the univocal narratives of sexual destiny through which dominant patterns of gender and 
desire are first created and then policed.  The attack on the disciplinary function of 
childhood innocence that arises out of these objections has taken two main forms in 
recent times.  James Kincaid and his followers have cast a withering veil of scepticism 
over the literature of innocence from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, locating 
within its alleged displacements and evasions the hypocritical concealment of predatory 
paedophilic longings and the stimulus to child-molestation (Kincaid, 1992; 1998; 
McCreery, 2004). More radically still, and with an importantly contrasting goal, the 
primacy accorded sexual self-fashioning in certain strains of postmodern thought, such as 
Queer Theory, prompts the denunciation of childhood innocence as one of the 
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cornerstones of the heteronormative life-schedule, supporting the patriarchal structures of 
compulsory heterosexuality and fixed gender determination.4  Innocence is no longer 
simply an irrelevant historical curiosity in these readings, it is a central reference point in 
a wider mythology of childhood that helps uphold an unjust moral order in which both 
adults and children are subject to the oppressive politics of purity.  Eroticised objects of 
an alienated adult gaze, children confined within the economy of innocence are denied 
full sexual and ethical agency, whilst at the same time functioning symbolically to 
validate a dialectic of vulnerability and corruption that constrains adult sexual autonomy.  
As Lesnik-Oberstein and Thomson observe (2002, pp. 35-46),  
 The child has thus a strange identity, one that is not at one with itself, even in the act 
 of figuring the very thing that is at one with itself…. In this way, it incorporates into 
 itself the dialectic it is called upon to forestall. So it is in its absolute singularity that it 
 is read as the most stable, the most fixed, the unquestioned and unquestionable–
 universally. In short, it is without question. 
 
 
 Contemporary scholarly opposition to the concept of the innocence of childhood 
serves several distinct polemical purposes.  They each share, however, the broadly 
Arièsian understanding of the origin of the myth of innocence and trace the ideological 
pedigree of the concept almost without exception to the same historical conjuncture.  This 
is vital to an understanding of the widespread indictment of innocence in the literature of 
childhood studies, its unanimity perhaps jarring ironically with a disciplinary ethic that 
elsewhere proclaims the virtues of alterity and the eschewal of closed explanatory 
systems.  Higonnet (1998, p. 8) sums up an academic consensus that has solidified in the 
literature into an overarching orthodoxy: 
 Historians date the modern, western concept of an ideally innocent childhood 
 to somewhere around the seventeenth century. Until then, children had been 
 understood as faulty small adults, in need of correction and discipline, especially 
 Christian children who were thought to be born in sin.   
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Interestingly, the imprecise reference to the ‘seventeenth century’ starting-point, which is 
vaguely indebted to Ariès’ chronology, is rarely followed through in these statements of a 
supposedly self-evident historical truth.  The conventional historiography of innocence 
almost always leaps from gesturing tokenistically to a presumed but barely acknowledged 
seventeenth century bench-mark on to Rousseau or some other foundational moment of 
the Romantic movement.  For it is, of course, with Romanticism that the trouble with 
innocence really begins (Haudrup, 2000, pp. 39-59).  The zealous rejection of one myth–
–the conceit of childhood innocence––is matched by the convenient embrace of another: 
the myth of origins, which strives to assign the emergence of innocence to a specific and 
decisive turning point in early modern European culture’s perception of the child. 
 
The allusion to a vaguely realised pre-Romantic backdrop to the rise of innocence has a 
potential to open up lines of enquiry into the area that few commentators have pursued.5  
Probing the late Renaissance interest in the transcendentalism of childhood not only 
converges with new post-Ariès assessments of the emergence of the modern institutions 
of childhood (Somerville, 1992; Classen, 2005; Cunningham, 2006), it also holds forth 
the prospect of reconnecting critical awareness with a wider and more ancient historical 
grammar of innocence embracing the cultural work of a range of discursive genres, 
including theology, philosophy, mysticism and poetics.  This task, it can be seen, furthers 
the genealogical endeavour by problematising an accepted critical dogma and excavating 
the hidden history of the elusive idea of innocence in order more effectively to 
comprehend its sources and evaluate its continuing influence.  The general resistance to 
such a move within the broad critique of innocence may reflect the impact of prevailing 
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disciplinary specialisations. It might also point, however, to an implicit recognition that 
the current academic consensus on the concept performs a pivotal––even necessary––
function in the wider critical appraisal of childhood in contemporary culture and society 
(Masschelein, 2003; Ryan, 2008). 
 
 
II HISTORIES OF INNOCENCE 
Insistence on a High Romantic turning point in the fortunes of childhood innocence rests 
upon a view of preceding values that oversimplifies the legacy of the deep past while 
subduing those elements within it that complicate the contrived contrast of perceptions 
before and after the decisive Romantic intervention.  In a more nuanced historiography of 
innocence, the Romantic account of childhood can be seen to participate in a rich and 
variegated movement of feeling with roots running far back into the religious, 
philosophical and aesthetic traditions of Western culture.  Acknowledging this truth does 
not erase the memory––or the inheritance––of the pessimistic moral and theological 
systems, derived chiefly from the Augustinian fall-redemption paradigm and its Calvinst 
variants, in which childhood was also systematically configured in the late medieval and 
early modern periods (Somerville, 1982; Stables, 2008, pp. 51-56). It is precisely from 
the logic of such antitheses that a more generous account of the lineage of childhood 
innocence is seeking to escape.  It may nevertheless be significant that much 
contemporary theorising about childhood echoes the fatalistic, querulous tone of some of 
the bleakest of the early modern Christian commentators.  That a pre-Romantic Christian 
emphasis upon the depravity of childhood existed, interdependent with a widespread 
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punitive regime of adult control and surveillance of children in church, home and school, 
is not in dispute (Thomas, 1990; Orme, 2006, pp. 128-163). It requires to be set 
alongside, however, another tradition of thought with equally profound investments in 
Judaeo-Christian scripture and doctrine––including largely forgotten but influential 
movements of speculative Christian mysticism in which the image of the child played a 
commanding role.   
Contrary to the findings of Ariès, there existed in the Middle Ages a large corpus of 
Christian writings devoted to descriptions of the innocence of childhood and the 
uniqueness of children’s experience.  The twelfth-century mystic Hidegarde of Bingen 
compared the goodness of children to the brightness of the angels (1986, p. 299).  Dante 
could write that “...In little children only mayst thou seek/True innocence and faith...”; 
(1962, p. 229). Latin lexicographers wrongly traced the etymology of puer, a boy, and 
puella, a girl, to puritas, meaning ‘pure’; and one divine could write ‘Children are as pure 
as heaven.’ (Shahar, 1990, 17-20; Schultz, 1995; Orme, 2001, pp. 188-189). The 
formulation most readily associated with Rousseau, that ‘There is no original perversity 
in the human heart. There is not a single vice about which one cannot say how and 
whence it entered…’ (1979, p. 56), has powerful affinities with elements of the English 
Puritan and Rhineland inner light movements of the centuries that preceded Rousseau and 
by the Continental variants of which he was clearly influenced.  It is the dissenting tracts 
and Puritan psychobiography of seventeenth century writers, such as the Digger Gerrard 
Winstanley, which, in the English tradition especially, form the crucible in which the 
modern conception of childhood innocence finds its most defiant assertion: ‘...a childe 
that is new borne, or till he grows up to some few yeares...is innocent, harmeless...And 
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this is Adam, or mankinde in his Innocency.’ (Sabine, 1941, pp. 494-495). The image of 
the child as representative of a prelapsarian perfection and unity of being is a perennial 
metaphor in the literature of religious mysticism, alchemy and the esoteric tradition.   
Recent scholarship into the prehistory of Romanticism has shown that the teachings of 
the Protestant inner light sects made an immense contribution to the development of 
psychological interiority in European thought and writing (Berlin, 1993; Beiser, 2003), 
including the preservation and consolidation of the tradition of childhood innocence in a 
period of religious confrontation and cultural crisis.  In the European context especially, 
belief in the fundamental innocence of childhood––understood, it ought to be 
emphasized, as a type of the radical innocence of general humanity––can be interpreted 
as a form of resistance to the dominant cultural hegemony of the contending fall-
redemption theologies of Protestant Predestinarians and Counter-Reformation Jansenists.  
To espouse an alternative, subterranean tradition, conveyed from antiquity through 
Christian Neoplatonism and its multiple philosophical progeny, became the signature of a 
particular style of European spiritual dissenter, cutting across confessional divides 
(Marcus, 1978).  Jeremy Taylor typifies, in the turbulent English setting of the 1640s and 
50s, the Anglo-Catholic protest against the Calvinist emphasis on the polluted origins of 
the unregenerate human infant, mired in the concupiscence of Original Sin.  For thinkers 
like Taylor, the innovative Puritan attention to childhood and domesticity was an 
undoubted stimulus for renewed psychological interest in, and moral solicitude towards, 
the young.   It also, however, repeatedly pathologised children and reinforced a repellent 
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ontology of generational separateness based upon its characteristically despondent 
disciplines of introspection: 
 
 But it is hard upon such mean accounts to reckon all children to be born enemies 
 of God...full of sin and vile corruption when the Holy Scriptures propound  
 children as imitable for their pretty innocence and sweetness, and declare them 
 rather heirs of heaven than hell….These are better words than are usually given  
 them; and signify, that they are beloved of God, not hated,  designed for heaven and 
 born to it...not born for hell: that was ‘prepared for the devil and his angels’ not 
 for innocent babes. This does not call them naturally wicked, but rather  
 naturally innocent, and is a better account than is commonly given them by imputation 
 of Adam’s sin (Taylor, 1665, pp. 164-165). 
 
 
Thirty years previously, John Earle, the Bishop of Salisbury, in his hugely popular 
collection of ‘characters’, Microcosmographie of 1628, extended the theological defence 
of the innate innocence of childhood by interpreting it as a recapitulation of the originary 
innocence of the Garden of Eden: 
 A Child is a Man in small letter, yet the best Copie of Adam before he tasted of 
 Eve, or the Apple…His father hath writ him as his owne little story, wherein 
  he reades those dayes that he cannot remember; and sighes to see what  
 innocence he hath out-liu’d…(Earle, 1899, p. 185). 
  
 The references by Winstanley and Earle to parallels between the innocence of 
childhood and the prelapsarian condition of the first human beings is a poorly understood 
element in the symbolic pattern of innocence in Christian thought. In the divided England 
of the middle of the seventeenth century, the theme was taken up by a generation of 
Anglican clergymen-poets, at odds with the prevailing theological and political temper of 
their time and place, yet of vital importance in the transmission of key features of a 
suppressed Christian tradition, included in which were a set of core beliefs about the 
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spiritual cache surrounding the image of the child (Martin, 1938).  To the evangelical 
imagination, the translation of this vein of thought to the plane of inner, psychological 
experience made the child described by those writers into an emblem of privileged 
sensitivity and freshness of sensation––the ultimate icon of wholeness, integration and 
the transformation of the imperfection of the world into the possibilities of new life: 
 
 Certainly Adam in Paradise had not more sweet and curious apprehensions of the  
 world than I when I was a child...All appeared new, and strange at first,  
 inexpressibly rare, and delightful and beautiful. My knowledge was divine...I  
 seemed as one brought into the estate of innocence...Boys and girls tumbling in the 
 street, and playing were moving jewels... 
  (Traherne, 1990, p. 226). 
 
 
This is Thomas Traherne writing in 1668, almost a century and a half before Blake and 
Wordworth.  Traherne declares that, as a child, ‘...I felt a vigour in my sense/That was all 
spirit...I nothing in the world did know/But ‘twas divine.’ (p. 5). Many currents of 
thought are clearly evident in utterances of this kind, but the consistency and the 
coherence of the underlying complex of ideas are irreducible, and form an indispensable 
foundation for much subsequent understanding of the quickened awareness, and the 
spiritual and moral sensibility, of the child.  Viewed––when considered at all––as a local 
aberration, Traherne in fact typifies a powerful, if deliberately marginalised, vector in 
English piety of the period.    
 
An interesting locus of the wider movement of feeling from which this inclination 
emerges can be seen in the writings of Traherne’s older contemporaries, the twin brothers 
Thomas and Henry Vaughan.  The general tenor of Thomas Vaughan’s abstruse, 
 11
alchemical speculations shares the attitudes of those late Renaissance mystics for whom 
the child is a central representation of both continuity and renewal: ‘This Consideration 
of my self when I was a Child, hath made me since examine Children...A Child I 
suppose, in puris Naturalibus, before education alters and ferments 
him...Notwithstanding, I should think, by what I have read, that the naturall disposition of 
Children…is one of those things, about which the Antient Philosophers have busied 
themselves even to some curiosity.’ (Vaughan, 1990, p. 521). Thomas Vaughan here 
shows the influence of a number of Continental thinkers, principally Weigel, Gorlitz, and 
the great German mystic Jacob Boehme, whose works were much translated into English 
in the second half of the seventeenth century. Boehme’s principal concern is to defend 
early childhood as the naturalistic expression of an essential unity of being upon which 
the sovereignty of the mature, integrated self depends.  It is a view with affinities to 
Platonism, but distinguished by a belief––which foreshadows Wordsworth––in the 
uniqueness of the psychological chemistry through which infants, especially, construct a 
pre-rational picture of the world.  This is a condition, Boehme insists (mischievously 
inverting a familiar educational metaphor), from which adults, in proximity to infants, 
can continue to be enriched: ‘Little Children are our Schoolmasters…they bring their 
sport from their Mothers wombe, which is a Remnant of Paradise.’ (1647, p. 130). By 
‘sport’, Boehme means ‘play’, and his delight in children’s instinctive and spontaneous 
inclination to play represents one of the first reflections upon the link between innocence 
and play in the veneration of childhood.  In another typical inversion of what had by then 
become a clichéd simile in popular devotional writing, the Philosopher in Boehme’s 
Aurora of 1656 poses the question ‘To Whom now shall I liken the Angles?’ He provides 
 12
his own answer:  ‘I will liken them to little children, which walk in the fields in May, 
among the flowers, and pluck them, and make curious Garlands, and Poseys, carrying 
them in their hands rejoicing.’ (Boehme, 1656, p. 321). 
 
Thomas Vaughan’s brother, the poet-priest Henry Vaughan, advances a still more 
personalised and visionary rendering of these beliefs, dwelling upon the redemptive 
possibilities of capturing the child’s ‘...age of mysteries! which he/Must live twice that 
would God’s face see,’ and ‘by mere playing go to Heaven.’  For Henry Vaughan, ‘the 
white designs that children drive’ (’Child-hood’: 1983, p. 288) include an innate 
perception of the pristine integrity of the created order, with the sanctity of which the 
child has profound spiritual affinities: 
 Happy those early days when I  
    Shined in my angel-infancy 
 Before I understood this place 
    Appointed for my second race, 
 Or taught my soull to fancy aught 
    But a white celestial thought... 
 (‘The Retreat’, p. 172) 
 
At the heart of this view of the child lies the evolving modern belief in the continuity of 
the self though time, and it is from this point that increasing emphasis is placed upon the 
connection between healthy early childhood experience and the moral and psycho-
spiritual well-being of the adult individual.  These ideas are of course central to the 
educational philosophies of late Renaissance thinkers such as Locke and Comenius 
(Singer 2005).   Ever since the affinities between Henry Vaughan and Wordsworth were 
first identified by Bishop Trench in 1868––focused mainly upon the striking similarities 
between Vaughan’s poem ‘The Retreat’ and Wordsworth’s ‘Intimations Ode’––the 
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preoccupation with innocence in the writings of Vaughan and his contemporaries has 
been interpreted proleptically and recruited to a teleology that privileges rather than 
analyzes the seeming originality of the Romantic transformation of perceptions of 
childhood.6  Yet there is a compelling justification, given the climate of enquiry in which 
Vaughan’s outlook was formed, to look backwards in time rather than forwards, to probe 
more deeply into the historical genealogy of this version of innocence, grappling with the 
still earlier sources upon which Vaughan and his contemporaries quite expressly drew. 
 
Traherne, the Vaughan brothers, and the broader range of Anglican writers such as 
Herrick and Herbert who participated in the anti-Calvinist defence of childhood, 
belonged to a wider coalition in latitudinarian Protestant thought in the Europe of the 
later Reformation.  They looked to a recovery of the wisdom of the early Church Fathers 
and of pre-Nicene patristics as a means of combating the morbidity of extreme Calvinism 
whilst avoiding the errors of Rome (Walker, 1964, p. 11). This was a quest that incurred 
the wrath of Calvin and his followers, who accused their opponents of Pelagianism and 
Arianism and of denying the gravity of Original Sin.  In their revolt against what they 
saw as the fatalism of the Calvinist doctrines of depravity and atonement, the Anglican 
school, centred on the Cambridge Platonists, drew deliberately upon the writings of the 
second century Church Fathers Irenaeus of Lyons (c125-202) and Origen (c185-254) as a 
means of refuting propositions they had come to regard as the consequences of a perverse 
Calvinist interpretation of Augustine.  The seventeenth century passion for the writings of 
Irenaeus, in particular, fed directly into the work of the Cambridge Platonists and through 
them exercised an immense influence on Traherne and the Vaughan brothers (Grant, 
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1971). One of the main sites of contention in this struggle, signalled implicitly in the 
repeated invocations of the figure of Adam in the literature cited above, was the early 
chapters of the Book of Genesis and, especially, the disputed interpretation of the 
character of the prelapsarian condition enjoyed by Adam and Eve.  It seems clear that in 
his reflections upon of the Pauline account of the Fall and the symbolism of the 
relationship between God and the primal humans, Irenaeus of Lyons had come to 
consider Adam and Eve to be, at least metaphorically, children: 
 Adam and Eve . . . ‘were naked and were not ashamed,’ for there was 
 in them an innocent and infantile mind, and they thought or understood 
 nothing whatsoever of those things that are wickedly born in the soul through 
 lust and shameful desires. For at that time they preserved their nature intact,  
 since that which was breathed into the handiwork was the breath of life; and 
 while the breath remains in its order and strength, it is without  
 comprehension or understanding of what is evil.7 
 
 At the heart of Irenaeus’ soteriology is the story of God’s paternal care for the 
infants in the Garden.  The complication of the ontological freedom accorded the first 
humans is that they are by necessity placed by their Creator in a condition of endless 
becoming––even, self-fashioning––which leaves their ‘discretion still underdeveloped’ 
and their free wills prey to ‘the deceiver’.  For Adam ‘was a child and had need to grow 
so as to come to his full perfection.’ (Irenaeus, 1952, pp. 12, 14). The key biblical 
doctrine underpinning Irenaeus’ unflinchingly orthodox yet ultimately optimistic view of 
the Fall is the Genesis statement that humanity is made, first and foremost, in the image 
of God.  As Marshall and Parvis have proposed, the distinctive character of this emphasis 
on the concept of the imago dei resides in its materiality: matter and flesh are good and 
whole.  The corporeal embodiment of the individual infant signifies the integrity of 
‘something bodily and physical in which all human beings share.’  It is, they argue, ‘not 
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lost at the Fall but rather remains as a locus of God’s saving power in the world…It is 
inclusive, it sees things from the side of the most vulnerable, and it points ahead.’ (2004, 
p. 324). The innocence of childhood is, for Irenaeus and the Renaissance poetic 
theologies shaped by his rediscovery, not static, but dynamic and developmental.  It is an 
image of absolute dependence and absolute potential.   In the prosecution of these 
arguments, Irenaeus typifies an important yet often overlooked strain in early Christian 
theodicy, with roots in the highly pro-juvenile language of the New Testament.  Here the 
fundamental dignity of the person of the child is shown to derive not from the exercise of 
reason or moral capability (about the validity of each, in a child, there might legitimately 
be doubt), but from the mere fact of being: the possession of a body, and a body viewed 
as a reiteration of the innocence and vulnerability of the divine child laid in the manger.  
The essentially incarnational quality of patristic thinking on these questions, taken up in 
the writings of Clement of Alexandria (c150-215), Tertullian (c160-220) and Cyprian 
(c208-258), defied the norms of pagan antiquity in proposing the innocence of childhood 
as a blueprint and inspiration for the Christian life.  This innocence is, moreover, not 
simply nostalgia for the apparent absence of sin in the prologue to lived, rational 
experience.  It is a set of positive values attached to the state of childhood, centred upon 
children’s physical presence, their spontaneity, their predispositions, their appetites, their 
capacity for play and their relationship with their parents––of which Clement, in 
particular, has a markedly optimistic view (Bakke, 2006, pp. 58-72). Commenting on the 
implications of this neglected cluster of New Testament and patristic convictions, the 
theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar (1991, pp. 11-12) has noted that through it, 
 the ways of the child, long since sealed off for the adult, open up an original 
 dimension in which everything unfolds within the bounds of the right, the true, 
 the good, in a zone of hidden containment which cannot be derogated as  
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 ‘pre-ethical’ or ‘unconscious,’ as if the spirit of the child had not yet awakened,  
 or was still at the animal level—something it never was, not even in the mother’s  
 womb. That zone or dimension in which the child lives, on the contrary, reveals  
 itself as a sphere of original wholeness and health…. 
 
 
Von Balthasar’s bold additional claim that ‘…everywhere outside of Christianity the 
child is automatically sacrificed’ (1968, p. 257), underlines (with a grim and unwitting 
irony, perhaps, given the recent record of some of the ministers of his Church) the 
contrast between the early Christian valorisation of the child and the often destructive 
classical asymmetry of adult and child out of which the calamitous practices of 
infanticide and pederasty were sanctioned in the ancient world.  The Christian opposition 
to such social practices was a frequent source of controversy in the Roman Empire and 
laid an important foundation for the development of the Christian understanding of 
childhood generally and the innocence of childhood in particular (Gundry-Volf, 2001). 
  
III INNOCENCE RECLAIMED 
The reclamation of these enduring ideas in certain areas of Reformation theology––
largely in response to the internecine crisis of Calvinism––can be shown to be a far more 
significant aspect of the history of innocence than is commonly acknowledged.  As 
appreciation increases of the extent to which core Romantic principles germinated in the 
milieu of dissenting Protestant spiritualities, represented by key transitional figures such 
as Hamann and Swedenborg, so the persistence of the subversive legacy of innocence 
assumes a subtly altered place in the intellectual ancestry of Romanticism (Balfour, 
2002). Indeed, John Mee has gone so far as to claim that English High Romanticism is at 
its core a mutation of the Reformation virtue of ‘enthusiasm’, with everything this entails 
for the social control of the disruptive spiritual and libidinous energies of childhood 
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(Mee, 2003). Recognising the indebtedness of writers such as Blake and Wordsworth to 
the legacy of dissenting thought refurbishes understanding of their strategic application of 
the concept of innocence to the prophetic project of redeeming childhood from the 
dominant functional, performative and disciplinary discourses of early industrial society.  
In keeping with the prevailing critical scepticism towards innocence, the direction of 
contemporary Romantic theory is strongly inclined against this claim, dwelling instead 
upon the centrality of innocence to a wider, sinister cultural programme of containment 
and self-regulation in which Romantic notions of an ideal childhood are discursively 
located (Plotz, 2001, pp. 56-60).  Even seemingly progressive social endeavours––most 
especially modern, child-centred education––allied to the Romantic vision of childhood 
as a state inherently innocent, free and sometimes even ecstatically captivated by the 
wonder of a prodigal world, survive little of the withering accusatory glare of post-
Romantic ideological suspicion.  Every cultural undertaking involving the idealised 
image of the child is, in this critical scrutiny, always from its inception fatally haunted by 
the contradictions of the Romantic inheritance, prey to its displacements and suppressions 
of everything in actual childhood that is not compliant with the normative overarching 
ideal (Bunyard 2010). 
 
Powerful though this critique can often be, and prudent though it is to treat the 
transcendental claims of Romantic argument with caution, wholesale repudiation of the 
Romantic defence of childhood involves a denial of the sophistication with which 
Romantic art confronts the paradoxes and crises of childhood innocence in a perilous and 
volatile world. As Roni Natov has shown, William Blake’s famous affirmation of the 
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condition of innocence exuberantly celebrates the fundamental plasticity of early 
childhood, its capacity to respond to experiences of conflict and stress just as readily as it 
embraces those vouchsafing attachment and fulfillment (Natov, 2003, pp. 9-21).  The 
dialectic of Innocence and Experience is acted out in both the psyche of the child and in 
the disfigured cultural order of which he or she is a part.  As well as ratifying the child’s 
vital access to an atavistic unity of being, Blake’s Songs of Innocence and of Experience 
repeatedly confront the child’s primal fear of abandonment and represent it poetically and 
visually as an anxiety overcome only after great struggle.  The Chimney Sweeper, the 
Little Girl Lost, the Little Boy Lost––all the various child-protagonists of Blake’s songs–
–endure the impact of a ruthless adult society in which childhood is tyrannised by 
overlapping forces of economic, racial and religious subordination.  The innocence 
embodied in these compelling personalities is elevated to a form of resistance by its 
moral intelligence and its access to resources of the imagination that reproach the 
brutality and hypocrisy of the zone in which childhood finds itself repeatedly confined: 
They clothed me in the clothes of death, 
And taught me to sing the notes of woe. 
 
And because I am happy, & dance & sing, 
They think they have done me no injury: 
And are gone to praise God & his Priest and King 
Who make up a heaven of our misery. 
(‘The Chimney Sweeper’, Blake, 1988, p.22) 
The endurance and transformative power Blake associates with innocence is forged out of 
its engagement with, and not its flight from, the oppressive delusions of experience and 
its diminished version of human purpose.  Radical innocence overcomes these limitations 
not by recourse to an unsatisfactory transcendentalism, but by the assertion of authentic 
and humanising ideals consistent with the propensities and appetites of childhood itself.  
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Freedom of movement, familial belonging, natural compassion, desire (including, 
daringly, sexual desire), resilience, and continuity with the ecology of other living things 
represent, in Blake’s poetry of childhood, properties that are constitutive of innocence, 
affording eventual access to a higher synthesis in which the ‘contrary states’ of Innocence 
and Experience are transformed. The child, for Blake, is a source of human feeling that 
opposes limits, particularly those limits associated with the patriarchal power of the 
despotic father God and his secular successors in the rationalist systems of production 
and authority governing the institutions of early industrial society.  The innocent child is 
not an escape from these systems, nor is she even simply a victim.  Rather, she is––as she 
was for Blake’s dissenting forebears––a dangerous memory, both individual and 
collective, of a different way of thinking about human destiny. 
 
The Romantic enunciation of innocence is not exhausted by Blakean dialectics.  It has 
many subtle inflections, covering the spectrum from the vatic exaltation of childhood to a 
conciliatory ceremonial naturalism healing the division between adult and child within 
highly specified hierarchies of social relation.  The children who populate Wordsworth’s 
poems, such as ‘We Are Seven’ or ‘Anecdote for Fathers’, once again refuse an easy or 
complacent staging of this reconciliation of the generations, emphasising instead the 
evasive and refractory quality of the adult-child encounter and its ironically contrasting 
styles of reasoning: 
Oh dearest, dearest Boy! My heart 
For better lore could seldom yearn 
Could I but teach the hundredth part 
Of what from thee I learn. 
(‘Anecdote for Fathers’, Wordsworth, 1992, pp.132-134). 
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Wordsworth has been rightly praised for ‘giving voice’ to children, if also, more recently, 
admonished for his frequent neglect of the real children in his care.  Plotz is surely 
wrong, however, in her suggestion that the concept of childhood innocence barely 
interested him (2001, 55-58).  Facile, sentimental definitions of innocence certainly bored 
Wordsworth, as they did Blake. Nevertheless, Wordsworth’s efforts to extend 
conversational voice to marginal and isolated figures were clearly founded upon the 
recognition he wished to confer on the ‘state of greater simplicity’ defended in the 
Preface to the Lyrical Ballads and in his time conventionally dismissed by high art 
(Wordsworth, 1992, p. 60; Marcus, 1985). Indeed, it is the dialogic quality of 
Wordsworth’s poetry of engagement that allows him in narrative poems such a ‘The Idiot 
Boy’ and ‘Michael’ to adjudicate between different versions of innocence across a range 
of personalities and landscapes within the poems, including those of mature adult 
protagonists emotionally bonded with children and alive to the uniqueness of their 
response to experience. The outcome of such an encounter with innocence is, for the 
adult, most certainly gain and not loss. Indeed, it may be by virtue of a parallel synergy of 
hopes and interests across the generations that, as Barbara Garlitz has so ably 
demonstrated, Wordsworth’s most ecstatic articulation of the innocent sublimity of 
childhood, the ‘Immortality Ode’, assumed almost scriptural levels of cultural authority 
in egalitarian educational circles in nineteenth century Britain (Garlitz, 1966; Halpin, 
2008). Surfacing in diary entries, letters, essays, sermons, manifestos and political 
speeches, the rhetoric of the ‘Immortality Ode’ was powerfully and deliberately 
harnessed to radical demands for the extension of mass education and early claims for the 
recognition of children’s rights.  Two important correctives to the standard critique of the 
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language of innocence emerge from this.  First, the frequently suspect transcendentalism 
of the concept of innocence is seen to possess an unexpectedly progressive political 
traction.  Secondly, the ‘democractisation’ of innocence in its passage from elite to 
popular culture, and in its potent enrichment of the discourses of educational access, 
underscores a vital if often obscured principle at the heart of the Wordsworthian defence 
of the innocence of childhood tout court––that is, that innocence is an entitlement of 
childhood as well as a privilege of it (Dunne, 2008). 
 
IV INNOCENCE, EXPERIENCE, COMPETENCE  
The organic, abiding view of childhood innocence as a mobilising virtue in the creation 
and revival of a more general adult vitality contests many of the critical orthodoxies of 
contemporary critical theory, education and psychology (Saward, 1999).   It is certainly 
highly significant that the perceived Romantic recovery of the radical innocence of 
childhood in the period from approximately 1750-1830 paralleled the rise of industrial-
bureaucratic state and its emblematic institutions of disciplinary regulation and 
standardisation.  Foremost among these lay the gradual extension of mass elementary 
schooling to the general population, characterised by its patterns of classroom 
aggregation and simultaneous instruction modelled on the early factory system 
(Hamilton, 1989, pp. 97-120).  Orthodox histories of popular education, anchored in a 
dominant humanistic narrative of enlightened educational progress, inclined until 
comparatively recently to identify this movement, even in its obvious myriad 
imperfections, with the steady realisation of the ideals of key Enlightenment activists 
such as Comenius, Locke and Helvétius and their advocacy of popular schooling as 
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remedy for the ignorance, oppression and sectarianism of previous eras.  This version of 
the history of education is not by itself false, but it is incomplete, especially in its 
understanding of the cultural and ideological influences through which mass education 
was resourced and implemented from the early industrial period onwards.   
 
Even if Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian critiques of the role of popular schooling in 
the covert reproduction of docile subjectivities is in the final analysis to be challenged for 
its fatalism, the seemingly benign practices of interactive learning and teaching in the 
institutions of progressive education in the late Enlightenment period have nevertheless 
been implicated in the governance of children’s minds and bodies in forms of lasting and 
subtle significance to modern societies.  The advent of mass education––including, 
indeed, those versions openly declared to be emancipatory and inclusive––has been 
firmly embedded in the expansion of the complex legal, political, economic and cultural 
apparatus of the modern state and its increasingly searching demands on, and promises 
to, its ‘citizens’.  This explains why in both Europe (Gill, 2010, pp. 229-255) and the 
United States (Brewer, 2005, pp. 129-150) arguments raged in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries over the proper supervision of mass education and its 
relationship to political participation and state power.  Even the champions of a radically 
‘democratised’ concept of public education, such as Noah Webster or Mary 
Wollstonecraft, explicitly defended the role of the school in the nurture of a 
thoroughgoing social and political literacy which would ‘claim’ children for reason and 
republican virtue, if necessary by wresting them away from all other rival or regressive 
loyalties, including those of family and sect.  Contemporary manifestations of education 
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for citizenship, and the confident, applied rationality of P4C, may believe they have 
overcome or even abolished this tension, but the spectre of ‘regulated childhoods’ 
remains palpable in the ways in which discursive boundaries are set and emotional and 
investments moderated across these activities. 
 
Of course the educational zone that stood historically in many respects outside this 
structure of increasing surveillance and regulation proved to be the site most hospitable to 
the discourse of Romantic innocence and its attendant pedagogical values.  Both in theory 
and practice, infant or kindergarten education in Europe and America developed through 
its leading early nineteenth century exponents such as Pestalozzi and Froebel a defining 
philosophy of learning destined to form the core of progressive, child-centred education 
as the industrial era unfolded (Davis, 2010).  It is in fact difficult to overstate the extent to 
which the ethics of infant education through most of the nineteenth century reproduced 
the Romantic rhetoric of childhood innocence as both a general theory of childhood and a 
convincing rationale for early learning.  Indeed, it is only the subsequent steady 
encroachment of more obviously performative constructions of effective nursery 
education that has obscured this history, colluding in the annexation of the pre-5 
environment by the competence-driven objectives of the primary or elementary 
classroom.  Any suggestion that the rich, Romantic language of childhood innocence 
represents only a decadent, even disquieting, imposition on the lives of real children is 
rebutted in the recognition of the combative force it has assumed (and in some sense 
retains) in the defence of early childhood from the encroachments of instrumentalised 
conceptions of education––even those beguilingly tricked out in the garments of 
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empowerment and participation.  Against these pressures and inducements, the traditions 
of innocence understood in their full complexity propose a startlingly fresh vision of the 
child––a child who is endowed, Adam Phillips (1998, pp. 21-22) suggests, 
 …with an astonishing capacity for pleasure and, indeed, the pleasures of interest; 
 with an unwilled relish of sensuous experience which often unsettles the adults 
 who like to call it affection. This child who can be deranged by hope and 
 anticipation––by an ice-cream––seems to have a passionate love of life, a  
 curiosity about life, that for some reason isn’t always easy to sustain…Because 
 it is easy to sentimentalize and to idealize, the visionary qualities of the child, 
 this part of the legacy of romanticism––which is in Blake and Wordsworth 
 and Coleridge most explicitly––has been abrogated by psychoanalysis.  
 
Phillips’ wry yet penetrating commentary artfully positions psychoanalysis rather than 
philosophy as the unsuspecting heir to this aspect of Romanticism, at least with respect to 
its place in the histories of innocence.  Psychoanalysis inherits, perhaps without wishing 
to, the imagery of childhood laid down in the palimpsest of pagan, Christian and 
Romantic speculation with which this essay has been concerned.  But this is an imagery 
that surely cannot be contained within the therapeutic parameters of the psychoanalytic 
project, even at its most compensatory.  Always, the tradition of which innocence is such 
a potent expression pushes against these constraints, its inner dynamic urging a return 
that is also a renovation; its impulse utopian rather than arcadian in the future educational 
possibilities towards which it points. 
 
Correspondence: Robert Davis, University of Glasgow, School of Education, Eldon St, 





                                                
NOTES 
 
1 The range of literature in which this view is expressed is too vast to record exhaustively.  In the sociology 
of childhood see, most recently, Shanahan (2004), Wyness (2006, pp. 11-26), Meyer (2007), Jones (2009, 
pp. 108-117). See also James (1998, pp. 12-20). In the literature of child protection, an important statement 
is Kitzinger (1990). In Cultural Studies, see Jenkins (1998). In the visual arts the key text remains Higonnet 
(1998); see also Langmuir (2006, pp. 33-67). In literary studies, see Zornado (2001, pp. 101-135).  In the 
philosophy of education, Baker (2001, pp. 300-323). The view persists in historical studies as well: see 
Gillis (2002) and Levander (2009).  
 
2 Important rebuttals of Ariès may be found in Wilson (1980) and Pollock (1984, pp. 1-28).  See also 
Heywood (2010). 
 
3 The claim of early years education researcher, Reesa Sorin (2003), that ‘Coming from an early childhood 
teaching background…it is often difficult to shift from the view of the child as innocent…Early childhood 
pedagogy has for many years been based on the image of the child as innocent and in need of adult 
direction…’ is typical here. See also Kehily and Montgomery (2003, pp. 221-266). An attempt at 
formulating a viable understanding of ‘proper pleasure’ in early years settings in particular is advanced by 
Jones (2003).  
 
4 See the highly controversial book by Levine (2002), the collection of Bruhm and Hurley (2004), and Pugh 
(2011).  See also Robinson (2008).  
 
5 A notable yet tantalizing exception is Richardson (1999). Richardson alludes to the revival by 
Wordsworth and some of his contemporaries of ‘obscure seventeenth-century Anglican writers such as 
Vaughan and Earle.’ (25). 
 
6 See Zimmer (2002, pp. 30-65) and McMaster (1935). 
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